理解中国的 toB 企业服务市场，不能绕开中国企业的经营环境，而这是由国家的政治经济学主导的。中美两国的 toB 企业服务市场，因所处的社会制度不一样，本质上是完全不同的物种，不存在可比性。
理解中国政治经济学的关键，在于深刻意识到生产要素市场存在政府的行政干预。一切企业经济行为的蝴蝶效应从此展开。
“甲方如何被它的甲方对待，决定了它会如何对待自己的乙方，以此类推，无限扩散”。这种商业文化上潜移默化的模仿，传递，和放大效应非常明显。
SaaS 化和软件化都是 “供给不足，需求旺盛” 的自然产物，当一个社会是 “产能过剩，需求不足” 的时候，其在本质上是反 SaaS 化和软件化的。只有理解了这点，再去看中国的 toB 企业服务市场，才会豁然开朗。
一、农耕文化的家庭自留地制度vs软件的非标准化和外包化
欧洲的山林地形是经济上不自足，军事上可防守。中国的平原地形是经济上可自足，军事上难防守。东西方文明的差异也从这里展开。
这种差异会渗透到社会的方方面面，比如欧美居住区更多的是街区，而中国居住区更多的是小区。还记得曾经遍布全国的各种 “大院”，俨然一个个应有尽有的小型社会。
农耕文化有着强烈的自留地倾向，意味着其生存可以不依赖它与其他经济部门和整个社会的互动与博弈，独立自成体系。
如果整个社会是由一个个不同大小的 “大院”，“小区”，“自留地” 组成的，那么这个市场就被分割掉了，它们对于软件行业来说就意味着非标准化，通用性不高。各个独立的 “自留地” 都会演化出自己独特的需求，同时也有能力供养外部供应商。这就会导致软件行业的外包化。
古代有地主和佃农，现代有甲方和软件外包公司。地主拥有土地，只购买劳动力。这跟甲方会索取源代码的逻辑是一致的，乙方被不断剥夺知识产权的积累。在今天，很多地方做软件招标的定价体系依然是根据人头和工时。
二、增值税为地方主要税源vs企业的普遍 “消费力不足”
以消费税为主要税源的国家，和以增值税为主要税源的国家，是完全不同的体制。税与体制互为因果。
在以消费税为主的国家，鼓励消费是政府重要的工作，因为如果不鼓励就收不到税，政府的运转可能就会出问题。这是一种非常朴实和原始的动机。
中国是以增值税为主的国家，鼓励生产就成为了地方政府的一种必然，企业获得的各种政府 “转移支付” 的支持也主要在生产侧。当各地政府同时鼓励生产时产能过剩成为了一种必然。于是企业利润被挤压，企业的消费能力被削弱。
当产能过剩和需求不足同时发生时，企业的购买动力就会变成 “去产能化”，即愿意为销售买单。而提高效率降低成本对于企业来说痛点就不足了，付费意愿就会差不少，那么作为服务企业的 toB 公司自然赚钱难度陡增。
在欧美 SaaS 和软件行业被视为企业消费品，和欧美普遍以消费税为主要税源，是存在内在关系和联系的。只有成为企业消费品，toB 企业服务市场的资本价值才会真正显现。
三、市场里存在大量零和博弈vs大量小老头企业的同质化和低质量竞争
中国是以公有制为主体，多种所有制共同发展。这个公有制指的是国有企业和政府对经济的支配能力。某种程度上，中国的市场经济是由中央和地方、地方和地方之间的博弈关系来维护的。
比如，中央政策文件不能写的太细，需要给下面留有选择的空间，各地响应函数不一样，层层下达层层自我解读，总会跑出来最佳方案。这是一种中央和地方之间分权带来的百花齐放。
再比如，分税制下地方政府之间在各种生产要素方面全面竞争，使得企业可以在这种竞争中获得非常多的 “用脚投票” 的自由度，官员的评价体系跟营商环境强关联。这是一种地方与地方之间竞争带来的市场化。
它的好处显然易见，挑战则是两条：1. 官员的晋升竞争存在零和博弈，2. 官员的任用周期与企业的商业周期并不重叠。这会导致一种现象就是，以降本增效为主要价值点的 toB 企业服务公司无法快速横扫市场，市场中会存在大量小老头公司无法出清。
正常的市场，正和博弈会让大量公司要么兼并重组，要么自然淘汰，最后留下龙头企业。这在 toC 产品侧更容易发生一些。而 toB 侧存在大量关键节点和关键人，使得这种正和博弈难以顺利发生。
官员晋升制度带来了局部最优与全局最优之间的博弈，这是留给中央政府的重要命题。 从某种程度上看，SaaS 和软件行业比 toC 和消费行业更加渴望 “统一大市场” 的到来。
四、商业周期迭代过于迅速vs企业服务市场的低续费率和高获客成本
中国是一个商业周期轮换特别快、迭代非常迅速的国家，这从企业的平均寿命就可以看得出来。每年都有大量的公司注销，也有大量的公司注册，创业的残酷和活力并存，是一种非常有趣的现象。
中国大量的企业是挤在产业的中游和下游的。内卷化竞争带来的结果是它们必须依靠着现金流而活，而不是利润而活。商品流通环节在中国是一个庞大的市场，本质上是因为大家都在做 “垫资” 的生意，拿掉这个 “垫资” 价值，很多环节本质上是不创造价值的。
同时，为了对抗这种残酷的竞争，很多的生意模式都非常依靠 “预付费” 和 “预充值”，这又加速了只靠现金流不靠利润的囚徒困境。
这使得很多企业的生存具有脆弱性，一旦经济波动和周期到来，流通环节上任何的堵塞和延迟，都会要它们的命。而经济波动和周期都是客观存在，所以企业的生命周期就不可避免的很短暂。这对于 toB 企业服务来说，意味着来年的低续费率和需要不断打新的高获客成本。
低续费率和高获客成本，摧毁了 toB 公司的财务模型，使得很多 toB 公司陷入了 “提供了价值，卖不出价格” 的窘境里。这也是为什么现在那么多 SaaS 和软件公司都在往 “切交易”、“深入供应链” 等方向去延伸，借着数字化切入流通环节。
五、社会自治秩序的不足vs护城河和进入壁垒的难以建立
API 经济，SaaS 化，软件化，本质上都是一种水平社会自治秩序的数字化表达。行业内或者行业间越容易形成民间共识，toB 企业服务市场越容易繁荣，反之亦然。
API 经济，SaaS 化，软件化，更容易在 “有限责任” 的社会中孕育发展。toB 企业服务公司不需要一杆子捅到底，大包大揽，而是在某个环节或细分领域做到 “专精特新” 即可。
中国的国家经济动员能力极强，这就在一定程度上降低了对社会自治秩序的需求。中国政府以 “无限责任” 兜底整个社会，也在一定程度抬高了社会对于其他组织的要求。所以模仿这种 “无限责任” 的平台经济（即 toC 互联网）在中国发展得比 toB 互联网好很多，跟这种社会情绪不无关系。
一旦社会习惯了这种自上而下的垂直权威，对于从左到右的水平自治秩序就会缺乏信任。这也是为什么 toB 企业服务市场非常难产生真正意义上的龙头企业的原因。因为这个市场永远都可以存在新的进入者，竞争护城河迟迟建立不起来。
理解了中国的政治经济学，就会明白为什么美国 toB 企业服务市场的各种对标企业、经营指标、方法论、成功路径、和投资策略，在中国的 toB 企业服务市场会失效。中美两国 toB 市场的差别是制度性的，而不是发展阶段性的（跟单纯的人力成本弱相关）。
可能有人会问为什么中美两国的 toC 互联网市场的相似性更大一些，为什么不同的政治经济学没有从中起到作用？
这是一个很好的问题，可能需要另外一篇文章来详细阐述，但简单来说，toC 互联网市场在中国绕开了一些限制，比如人口户籍制度对于线上空间是不起作用的，比如最重要的生产要素 “数据” 是私有化的，比如配套资金不是来自银行借贷而是海外风投。
政治经济学告诉我们，行政手段造成的扭曲只有行政力量才能破解，这也是为什么 “统一大市场” 对于当下的中国这么重要。
政策红利在中国是一种重要的企业战略要素。获取政府的 “转移支付” 的能力将成为 toB 公司新的北极星指标。只有深刻理解了这种制度性差异，中国的 toB 企业服务市场才能走出自己的特色发展之路。
翻译;
To understand China’s toB service market, one cannot bypass the operating environment of Chinese enterprises, which is dominated by the country’s political economy. Due to their different social systems, the toB service markets of China and the United States are essentially completely different species, so there is no comparison.
The key to understand Chinese political economy lies in the deep awareness of the government’s administrative intervention in production factor market. From then on, the butterfly effect of all economic behaviors of enterprises began to unfold.
“How Party A is treated by its Party A determines how it will treat its Party B, and so on.” This kind of imitative, transmitting and amplifying effect on business culture is very obvious.
SaaS and software are both natural products of “insufficient supply and high demand”. When a society is “overcapacity and insufficient demand”, it is essentially anti-saas and software. Only by understanding this point, to see China’s toB enterprise service market, will be suddenly enlightened.
Farming culture of family land system vs software disstandardization and outsourcing
Europe’s mountainous terrain was economically unself-sufficient but militarily defensible. China’s plain terrain was economically self-sufficient but militarily difficult to defend. This is where the differences between Eastern and Western civilizations begin.
This difference will permeate into all aspects of society. For example, residential areas in Europe and America are more blocks, while residential areas in China are more residential areas. I still remember the various “compounds” all over the country, like a small society with everything.
Farming culture has a strong tendency to keep private land, which means that its survival can be independent of its interaction and game with other economic sectors and the whole society, independent system.
If the whole society is made up of “courtyards”, “communities” and “private plots” of different sizes, then the market will be segmented, which means non-standardization and low universality for the software industry. Individual “plots” will evolve their own unique needs, while also being able to support external suppliers. This leads to outsourcing in the software industry.
In ancient times there were landlords and tenant farmers; in modern times there are party A and software outsourcing companies. The landowners own the land and buy only the labor. This is consistent with the logic that Party A will ask for source code, and Party B is constantly deprived of intellectual property accumulation. Today, the pricing system for software bidding in many places is still based on heads and hours.
Value-added Tax is the main tax source of local governments vs the general “insufficient consumption power” of enterprises
Countries with consumption tax as the main source of tax and countries with value-added tax as the main source of tax are completely different systems. Tax and system cause each other.
In countries with consumption taxes, encouraging consumption is an important job for the government, because if you don’t encourage it, you can’t collect taxes, and the government might run into problems. It’s a very earthy and primitive motive.
China is a country dominated by value-added tax, so it is inevitable for local governments to encourage production, and the support of various government “transfer payments” obtained by enterprises is mainly on the production side. Overcapacity is inevitable when governments everywhere encourage production at the same time. As a result, corporate profits are squeezed and corporate spending power is weakened.
When overcapacity and lack of demand occur at the same time, the incentive for companies to buy becomes “de-overcapacity”, that is, the willingness to pay for sales. And to improve efficiency and reduce costs for enterprises, the pain point is insufficient, and the willingness to pay will be poor, so as a service enterprise, the toB company naturally makes money more difficult.
In Europe and America, SaaS and software industries are regarded as corporate consumer goods, and the consumption tax is generally the main tax source in Europe and America, there is an internal relationship and connection. The capital value of toB enterprise service market can only be realized when it becomes enterprise consumer goods.
There is a large number of zero-sum game vs a large number of small old enterprises of homogeneity and low quality competition in the market
In China, public ownership plays a dominant role and diverse forms of ownership develop side by side. Public ownership refers to the ability of state-owned enterprises and the government to dominate the economy. To some extent, China’s market economy is maintained by the game relations between the central and local governments and between local governments.
For example, a central policy document should not be written in detail. It needs to leave room for choice. The response function varies from place to place. This is a kind of decentralization between the central and local brought a hundred flowers bloom.
Another example is the comprehensive competition among local governments in various production factors under the tax sharing system, which enables enterprises to obtain a lot of freedom to “vote with their feet” in such competition. The evaluation system of officials is closely related to the business environment. It is a kind of marketization brought about by competition between localities.
Its advantages are obvious, but its challenges are twofold:
1. There is a zero-sum game in the promotion competition of officials; 2. The appointment cycle of an official does not overlap with the business cycle of an enterprise. This will lead to a phenomenon that the toB enterprise service companies with cost reduction and efficiency as the main value point cannot quickly sweep the market, and there will be a large number of small old companies in the market that cannot be cleared.
In a normal market, a positive-sum game would allow a large number of firms to either merge and reorganize or be eliminated, leaving the dominant player behind. This is more likely to happen on the toC product side. However, there are a large number of key nodes and key people on the toB side, which makes it difficult for this positive-sum game to happen smoothly.
The official promotion system brings about the game between the local optimal and the global optimal, which is an important proposition for the central government. In some ways, the SaaS and software industries are more eager for the arrival of the “one Big market” than the toC and consumer industries.
Business cycle iteration is too fast vs. low renewal rates and high acquisition costs in the enterprise service market
China is a country where the business cycle rotates very fast and iterates very quickly, as can be seen from the average life span of enterprises. With so many companies being written off and registered every year. The brutality and energy of entrepreneurship is a very interesting phenomenon.
A large number of Chinese companies are crowded into the middle and lower reaches of the industry. The result of internal competition is that they must live on cash flow, not profit. Commodity circulation is a huge market in China, essentially because everyone is doing “cushion” business, take away this “cushion” value, a lot of links in essence will not create value.
At the same time, in order to combat this cutthroat competition, many business models rely heavily on “prepaid” and “prepaid”, which accelerates the prisoner’s dilemma of relying on cash flow rather than profits.
This makes the existence of many businesses vulnerable to economic fluctuations and cycles, and any blockage or delay in the circulation link will kill them. Economic fluctuations and cycles are objective existence, so the life cycle of enterprises is inevitably very short. For toB enterprise services, this means low renewal rates for the coming year and high acquisition costs for new customers.
Low renewal rates and high acquisition costs destroyed toB’s financial model, leaving many toB companies in the dilemma of “providing value but not selling price”. This is why so many SaaS and software companies are now moving in the direction of “cutting transactions”, “going deep into the supply chain”, and using digitalization to cut into circulation.
The lack of social self-government order vs the difficulty of establishing moats and barriers to entry
API economy, SaaS, software, are essentially a kind of horizontal social autonomy order of digital expression. The easier it is to form private consensus within or between industries. The more likely the toB enterprise service market is to prosper, and vice versa.
API economy, SaaS, software, is easier to develop in a “limited liability” society. toB enterprise service companies do not need a stick to the end. But in a certain link or subdivision of the field to achieve “specialized and special”.
China’s national economic mobilization capacity is very strong, which to some extent reduces the need for social autonomy order. The Chinese government’s “unlimited responsibility” to cover the whole society has also raised the social requirements for other organizations to a certain extent. Therefore, the platform economy imitating such “unlimited responsibility” (toC Internet) has developed much better than toB Internet in China, which has something to do with this social sentiment.
Once society gets used to this top-down vertical authority, there is a lack of trust in a horizontal autonomy order from left to right.
This is also why the toB enterprise service market is very difficult to produce a real sense of the leading enterprises. Because there can always be new entrants to the market, a competition moat has been slow to build.
Understanding the political economy of China, you will understand why the various benchmarking firms, business indicators, methodology, success path, and investment strategy of the toB enterprise service market in the United States will fail in the toB enterprise service market in China. The differences between the toB markets in China and the United States are institutional rather than developmental stages (weakly related to pure labor costs).
Some people may ask why the toC Internet markets in China and the US are more similar. And why the different political economy does not play a role in this.
This is a good question, which may need another article to elaborate on. But in short, toC Internet market in China circumvents some restrictions. Such as the household registration system does not work for the online space. Such as the most important factor of production “data” is privatized. Such as the supporting fund does not come from bank lending but from overseas venture capital.
Political economy tells us that the distortions created by administrative measures can only be solved by administrative power. Which is why the “unified Great Market” is so important for China today.
Policy dividend is an important element of enterprise strategy in China. The ability to access government “transfer payments” will be toB’s new North star. Only with a deep understanding of this institutional difference can China’s toB service market go out on its own road of characteristic development.
本文由数字化转型网（www.szhzxw.cn）转载而成，来源：PingPlusPlus，作者：金亦治；编辑/翻译：数字化转型网宁檬树。
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